Was Aristotle a pragmatist? Not as we understand pragmatism today,
as a systematic method or philosophy of life—depending on whether you’re a
Peircean or Jamesian pragmatist.
In Topics,
Aristotle explores the various ways one can make a rational argument, or question
the logic of an opponent’s argument. In Book Three, which is devoted to methods
for weighing alternatives, he writes in Chapter Two, “[W]hen two things are
very like each other, and we cannot perceive any superiority of the one to the
other, we must investigate from the consequences” and “we must take whichever consequence
may be useful” (Trans. Octavius Owen).
That whole idea of usefulness is what received Bertram
Russell’s ire. He had no use for modern pragmatism. For Russell, we believed
things because they were true, whether they were useful or not. This sounded
too much like relativism for Russell.
Russell neglected to notice the qualifier, when “we cannot perceive
any superiority,” which for Aristotle, meant a rational reason to value one
over the other. If that rational reason
existed, then what William James would go on to call the “pragmatic maxim”
wouldn’t apply. True, Aristotle wasn’t above a little relativism. He goes on to
write that he values “temperance over courage,” since temperance is useful all
the time, and courage only some of the time. Even this bit or relativism points
out one of the hallmarks of pragmatism, it tends to concern questions about
abstracts in philosophy, and the as yet unknown in science, not the concrete or
known.
Peirce’s version of the pragmatic maxim is even more
grounded in logic than Aristotle’s. Peirce writes "Consider what effects that might conceivably have
practical bearing we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our
conception of these effects is the whole of our concept of the object"
("How to Make Our Ideas Clear" 218)
James, as usual, is a little more whimsical: “Now, without pledging ourselves in any way
to adopt this hypothesis, let us dally with it for a while to see to what
consequences it might lead if it were true” (Pragmatism 302).
Ah, Russell would have a problem with that one. But, James would only
apply this maxim to something that we were still uncertain of, not those things
we were certain of.