Listened to The Symposium last. Each of the three sections is just long enough for a six mile run, with five minutes or so left over to listen to Pandora. Given the topic of The Symposium, love, I thought something schmaltzy, like the Moody Blues channel, was appropriate.
I lost count of how many spoke, each in turn, in this account of a speaking contest that Plato apparently did not attend. Of course, it's all a set-up. Socrates speaks last, and outdoes everyone. Each participant gives a speech on love. (This is one of the few dialogues in which Socrates doesn't complain about speech-making, and doesn't interrupt other speakers to ask them unanswerable questions. For some reason, he's on his best behavior. The gadfly is silent until his turn to speak comes around.)
What I find interesting is how much time in this and other dialogues, most notably, Phaedrus, is devoted to the topic of love, and how little time modern philosophy seems to spend on the topic. We seem to have rewritten The Symposium so it isn't actually about love, but about "love of philosophy." And, of course, Weaver's well-known analysis of Phaedrus would have us believe that it's really about rhetoric. Thus, love is never a philosophical topic in the dialogues; it's merely a stepping stone to other, more important topics.
So, do we leave "love" to Nicholas Sparks and the Hallmark Channel? Is love so outside the realm of reason that it's not worth talking about?
I know, I'm overstating my complaint. If we are to trust the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, there is a philosophy of love. (However, look at the citations; almost all are from the Greeks. Not much in the Twentieth Century, and none in the Twenty-first, even though an internet encyclopedia is very Twenty-first Century.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/love/
More thorough citations in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/love/
And let's not forget Wikipedia. Lot's of links to online texts:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_love
Interesting that they all refer to love as a noun. I've always thought of it as a verb.
Posts about running, trail running, listening to Plato instead of music while running.
Thursday, November 5, 2015
Monday, November 2, 2015
Hume’s “An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.”
Listening to Hume’s “An Inquiry Concerning Human
Understanding.” Perhaps Hume’s most
famous soundbite: “That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no
less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the
affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to
demonstrate its falsehood” (IIII.1.21).
To put his more eloquent syntax in modern parlance: logic
(demonstrative, a priori, deductive reasoning) cannot prove that the sun will
come up tomorrow. Only inductive reasoning, or experience, leads us to “believe”
it will come up. Certainly, the probability
is high. But it is still only probable, not necessary, to use the language of
analytical philosophy. Science often uses the word “theory” in this way. In
science, a theory is a proposition that has been tested sufficiently that its
probability is so high that we can start to refer to it as a scientific fact. This
difference is often why Creationists can’t understand why scientists continue
to refer to the Theory of Evolution as a fact, and not “just a theory.” With every
discovery, the statistical likelihood becomes more and more probable. But it
will never be certain, just as the sun rising tomorrow will ever be certain.
This is the sort of game runners are playing when they train
for a race. Training is a way of building up experience, of terrain, of the
body, or what works (critical, since what works one day doesn’t seem to work
the next, confounding us as we try to figure out our best form or strategy) in
order to increase the probability that we will perform the way we wish for the next
race. Hume sometimes uses the word habit, though it doesn’t seem to be as
critical a word for him as it is for Charles Sanders Peirce, who goes as far as
to argue that everything happens from habit, even nuclear fusion. All I want to do is finish another 50 miler.
Every runner knows that it’s habit, the training you do before a race rather
than the race itself, that helps you finish that race.
Wednesday, October 28, 2015
Prior Analytics: Rhetoric, Dialectic, Logic
I've been trying to listen to Prior Analytics while running this week. (Octavius Owen translation.) Overall I find the book almost impossible to follow in audio format. Aristotle focuses so much on the structure of syllogisms that I can't follow his outline without the text in front of me. It's algebra class all over again. I did find the introduction, where Aristotle distinguishes between dialectic and syllogism, particularly this brief statement: "the dialectic proposition is to him who inquires an interrogation of
contradiction, but to him who syllogizes, an assumption of what is seen
and probable."
There are several interesting distinctions in this statement:
First, dialectic is a different genre of discourse from syllogism; in other words, dialectic and logic were not not synonymous for Aristotle, as they are often seen today.
Second, dialectic is a negative discourse, whereas syllogism is positive. One "interrogates contradiction." The other makes a statement that might then be interrogated. (Note that this is a different concept from Peirce's, who argues that logic cannot create new knowledge but only test knowledge.)
Third, syllogisms deal with the "probable," something that is seen in On Rhetoric as the province of rhetoric, not logic.
Overall, the introduction to Prior Analytics provides interesting insight into what Aristotle might have meant when he wrote that rhetoric was the "antistrophos" of dialectic. In much of the writing concerning the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy, this passage is seen as a defense of rhetoric as the counterpart of logic, that the two are intertwined. If that is the case, however, how do we account for this passage, where dialectic is seen as distinct from logic, or indeed, the title of this work, where logic is discussed as though syllogisms are the building blocks for effective rhetoric?
There are several interesting distinctions in this statement:
First, dialectic is a different genre of discourse from syllogism; in other words, dialectic and logic were not not synonymous for Aristotle, as they are often seen today.
Second, dialectic is a negative discourse, whereas syllogism is positive. One "interrogates contradiction." The other makes a statement that might then be interrogated. (Note that this is a different concept from Peirce's, who argues that logic cannot create new knowledge but only test knowledge.)
Third, syllogisms deal with the "probable," something that is seen in On Rhetoric as the province of rhetoric, not logic.
Overall, the introduction to Prior Analytics provides interesting insight into what Aristotle might have meant when he wrote that rhetoric was the "antistrophos" of dialectic. In much of the writing concerning the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy, this passage is seen as a defense of rhetoric as the counterpart of logic, that the two are intertwined. If that is the case, however, how do we account for this passage, where dialectic is seen as distinct from logic, or indeed, the title of this work, where logic is discussed as though syllogisms are the building blocks for effective rhetoric?
Wednesday, October 21, 2015
Laguna Atascosa NWR
This sign was at the trailhead at Laguna Atascosa this morning. As per the fine print, I picked up a mesquite branch, but it felt awkward while running.
Wednesday, October 7, 2015
Democracy and Oligarchy
The "warrant," to use Toulmin's terminology, that underpins democracy and oligarchy, and places them at odds with one another.
"Democracy arises out of the notion that those who
are equal in any respect are equal in all respects; because men
are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal."
"Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are unequal in
one respect are in all respects unequal; being unequal, that is,
in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely."
Aristotle. Politics. Book 9,
Part 1
Tuesday, October 6, 2015
Aristotle on the Gun Debate
The Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed."
Aristotle: "Without discipline, infantry are useless" (Politics 4.VIII)
Question: Will we be safer if we have more guns or more discipline?
Aristotle: "Without discipline, infantry are useless" (Politics 4.VIII)
Question: Will we be safer if we have more guns or more discipline?
Aristotle's Politics on a Hot Day
Listening to Aristotle's Politics while running the canal roads I'm struck, not for the first time, with how often his ideas are condensed, simplified, turned into sound bites that make him sound naive, if not simplistic. I've been guilty of doing the same myself. In the past I have been known to say that Aristotle divided political systems into two types,* oligarchy and democracy, and that, like Plato, he was critical of democracy. By the time I got to Fourth Book of Politics (only halfway through) I discovered that I was the one being simplistic.
What he actually writes is that most people think there are only two forms of government because these are the two forms they see the most often. He insists that "There are so many different kinds of democracies and of oligarchies" (VI). He then subdivides each into so many categories that I couldn't follow him while running. (It was 92 degrees; felt like 96 with the humidity figured in; I have an excuse.)
After mentioning that "an ideal state which is an aspiration only," he writes that governments must adjust to the situation, (a subtle dig at Plato?). Then he writes about a "polity or constitutional government" (IV) which he sees as the most effective government. This is a government that combines elements of an oligarchy and a democracy, trying, if incompletely so, to get the best of both. I won't go into details. This chapter is worth reading by anyone interested in politics. And, if Aristotle is right, we are political animals.
Just one factoid to illustrate how different our ideas of democracy are from those in 4th Century BC: According to Aristotle, oligarchies elect officials by vote; democracies elect officials by lot. (Why? Election by lots keeps the rich from being able to buy elections. Are you listening Koch brothers?)
*He also dealt with dictatorship and monarchy, but felt those required less attention. An assessment I agree with.
What he actually writes is that most people think there are only two forms of government because these are the two forms they see the most often. He insists that "There are so many different kinds of democracies and of oligarchies" (VI). He then subdivides each into so many categories that I couldn't follow him while running. (It was 92 degrees; felt like 96 with the humidity figured in; I have an excuse.)
After mentioning that "an ideal state which is an aspiration only," he writes that governments must adjust to the situation, (a subtle dig at Plato?). Then he writes about a "polity or constitutional government" (IV) which he sees as the most effective government. This is a government that combines elements of an oligarchy and a democracy, trying, if incompletely so, to get the best of both. I won't go into details. This chapter is worth reading by anyone interested in politics. And, if Aristotle is right, we are political animals.
Just one factoid to illustrate how different our ideas of democracy are from those in 4th Century BC: According to Aristotle, oligarchies elect officials by vote; democracies elect officials by lot. (Why? Election by lots keeps the rich from being able to buy elections. Are you listening Koch brothers?)
*He also dealt with dictatorship and monarchy, but felt those required less attention. An assessment I agree with.
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