Posts about running, trail running, listening to Plato instead of music while running.
Sunday, November 19, 2017
Aristotle on the Senses
Plato distrusted the senses. That's at least one of the points he was making in the Allegory of the Cave. In the opening of Metaphysics Aristotle takes the opposite tack. For him, the senses, and especially the sense of sight, provides evidence of our desire to know, in other words, are the evidence of, if not the basis for, a thirst for knowledge, perhaps even philosophy:
"ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things."
Currently listening to Augustine's "Confessions." In Book Ten he writes about the "Lust of Sight," by which he seems to be wary of "the beautiful," which was so much a part of Greek philosophy. The problem for Augustine was that what was good in the physical world might actually take our attention away from the God who created the good. He admitted that he was never sure whether he loved the good or loved the God behind the good.
This strikes me as an almost impossibly high bar, and Augustine takes the only way out, which is to deny himself goods, or at least too much of any one good, to guard against losing sight of God. For instance, he wrote about taking care only to eat enough to sustain the health of his body.
His ideas hark back to Plato, since he has made a distinction between what we can see and what we cannot, and what we cannot is better than what we can. His visible is a gift from God, and reflects his goodness, even though not as . . . at question is whether a reflection is a major distinction from an imitation.
Was Descartes the First Hippy?
"But I believed that I had already given sufficient time to
languages, and likewise to the reading of the writings of the ancients, to
their histories and fables. For to hold converse with those of other ages and
to travel, are almost the same thing. It is useful to know something of the
manners of different nations, that we may be enabled to form a more correct
judgment regarding our own. [Consequently], as soon as my age permitted me to pass from under
the control of my instructors, I entirely abandoned the study of
letters, and resolved no longer to seek any other science than the
knowledge of myself, or of the great book of the world."
Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences. Rene Descartes
Tuesday, November 7, 2017
Reconceptualizing Ethos, Logos, Pathos
"Mosquito battle gets political: Genetic engineering plan raises fears of 'Jurassic Park' invasion"
https://projects.jsonline.com/news/2017/10/5/mosquito-battle-gets-political.htmlThis article discusses the ongoing controversy over releasing genetically modified mosquitoes in Key West, Florida, to combat the spread of mosquito born disease. As the sub-title suggests, people have equated genetic engineering with the movie Jurassic Park.
Explaining resistance to the plan, James Lavery, the Hilton Chair in Global Health Ethics at Emory University, admits, “We have this kind of arrogance as scientists that once the findings will speak for themselves, then everything will change." He adds, “I always say that stories trump data and relationships trump stories. Scientists just sort of believe that their data should prevail at all times because it’s science, but we know from policy that that’s just not the way it works.”
Is it too much to match Lavery's terms--data, stories, relationships--with logos, pathos, ethos? If we do, what does that get us?
We certainly get a different way of thinking of these three terms than the standard interpretation from Aristotle. Logos matches data pretty well, though we know the term meant much more than this to the Greeks. Pathos in this quotation becomes stories, and the ways they move us. I can remember crying when Old Yeller died, even though I knew the dog playing Old Yeller in the movie didn't actually die, that since I saw the movie years after it was filmed, had probably already been dead for years. But, that data didn't matter to me. I cried. That's what stories do to us, they move us, not necessarily in tandem with the data, though not necessarily against it either. In science, according to Lavery, there often isn't any story at all; therefore, the data has almost no impact. We might go as far as to say that it doesn't even have logos, if by logos we mean that connection between reality and the intellect contained in that companion word, nous, also critical to Greek ideals. Ethos, in this rewriting, takes on a stronger position in the digital age even than it did for the Greeks. In the Polis, all interaction was built on strong personal connections that aren't sufficiently captured by the word, "friendship." Everyone knew from long experience almost everyone they came into contact with. In the multicultural, digital, social networked age we live in, our range of acquaintances is broad--and confused, fuzzy, often as in the case of celebrities, entirely fictional. Because these relationships are so small in comparison to society as a whole, and how we number who to include in the category "relationships" has become so tenuous, ethos has become even more powerful for us than it was for the Athenians, yet potentially so much more deceiving. Add the way so many of us only follow internet news that supports our preconceptions and you have a formula for belief in conclusions with no premises as all.
Friday, November 3, 2017
“What is more wholesome than any particular belief is integrity of belief.” Charles Sanders Peirce
I would love to let this statement stand on its own. Yet, I know that sound bites don't incline us to to any sort of complex thinking. And as short at it is; this sentence is very complex.
Sound bites allow too much room for interpretation, they take the words, not only out of the context of the surrounding words, but out of the context of the writer's ideas and into any unexplored context that fits only tangentially. A couple of examples of re-contextualization might suffice to show what I mean.
George Santayana’s succinct and oft (too oft) quoted, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (The Life of Reason 1 284) is usually interpreted as referring to history. Those who cannot remember the Holocaust are in danger of repeating similar atrocities. Those who cannot remember Trump may be convinced by another demagogue. As true as these statements might be, they couldn't be further from the point Santayana was trying to make. In The Life of Reason, he was writing a history, it is true, but about a history of reason, of ideas, and of the progress of philosophy. There are moments that it feels like he is writing a progressivist evolution of rationality--from Plato to Hume to Kant, Parmenides and Heraclitus to Russell (a bit of irony, there). There are other moments, and this is what I think he was really saying in this quotation, when it feels like he is writing about the give and take of pluralism and monism, realism and idealism, and cautioning us against ignoring previous thinkers lest we simply repeat their words rather than add to the conversation. He cautioned us against constantly starting over. To remember the past means to know what Kant thinks so we can build on those ideas, take the conversation a little further.
“The exception that proves the rule.” I’m going to let
Mental Floss handle this one. Sure this online newsletter has articles like, “10
Fascinating Facts about Airplane Bathrooms.” But its categories, “Change
Matters,” “Science,” and “History,” can be entertaining as well as informative,
without playing to the lowest common denominator, which admittedly, can be quite
low on the internet. http://mentalfloss.com/article/52698/how-does-exception-prove-rule The explanation on this site is essentially what Hegel argues in An Introduction to the Philosophy of History. It occurs to me that the explanation found in Hegel and Mental Floss applies well to cultural rules, but that the opposite explanation, that an exception proves the rule is flawed and needs to be revised, applies well to natural rules, that is, science.
So, back to Peirce's statement. If we don't take his words out of context, what can we do with the idea that, "What is more wholesome than any particular belief is integrity of belief"?We could start with "particular beliefs" since that part of the sentence seems self evident, and thus is suspect. We all know what beliefs are. Those are ideas, concepts, data, facts, that we accept, sometimes without question, often as being self evident, or at least believed for so long that we have lost track of how and why we believed them; we simply do. Often, those beliefs, the origins of which we've lost track of, are inherited. Our reason for believing them traces back, if we could trace them back, to being told by a parent, teacher, or other authority, and rests on nothing else.
Sometimes these beliefs rest comfortably at the conclusion of a lengthy chain of propositions or data. All too often, our propositions have been constructed after we already believe as a way of rationalizing this belief. (Though Bertrand Russell doesn't make this connection himself, in "On Propositions" his term "telescoped beliefs" refers to propositions which move from premise to conclusion without any intervening steps, a visible marker of accepted/rationalized belief.) Further causing difficulty is that any belief may trace back to an accepted belief, even though we can now claim logical reasons for that belief. Even a belief in logic as an acceptable tool for testing beliefs is itself a belief. Thus, the whole idea of beliefs gets rather murky. We need another way of testing beliefs than that we actually have them and can in some way defend them.
For Peirce, so immersed as he was in science, we might simply identify science and the logical precepts of science as a means of establishing the integrity of a belief. Of course, if we're going to follow the syntax of Peirce's statement, and Peirce was always precise in his statements (not always easy to read, but for anyone who is willing to invest the time, precise), he's not talking about integrity of a particular belief, but integrity of belief itself as a concept, or perhaps in the vein of pragmatism, belief as a method.
Perhaps this is where integrity of beliefs comes in, as a means of testing, if not the validity of believes, the value of beliefs. For a belief to have integrity, we must have a clear concept of several aspects of that belief:
First, we must have some idea of the why of that belief, at least in terms of why we hold that belief. Logical support isn't sufficient, since logic has to do with the validity rather than value.
Second, what we gain from that belief, James's much quoted (misquoted) "cash value." Many of our beliefs are self-serving, so much so that it's difficult to find a belief that is not. A more important question, at least in terms of integrity, is this: What sort of person might I become over time as a result of believing that particular belief? What self-conceptions, what strength or weakness of character might result from that belief and the actions and consequences of that belief? Integrity of belief forces us to question the causality between belief and character as the most significant consequence of any belief. Can we clearly trace causality between the two, or are they intertwined, reciprocal in a way suggested by the word ethos? Integrity of belief requires us to at least consider these questions even if they do not have a clear answer.
Third, how do these beliefs affect other beliefs? This is a key point James goes over often enough that I need not belabor it here. I'll only quote James once: "The
truth of ‘God’ has to run the gauntlet of all our other truths. It is on trial
by them and they on trial by it. Our final
opinion about God can be settled only after all the truths have been
straightened themselves out together” (Pragmatism 52).
From my perspective, and I admit how personal this perspective is (another marker of integrity of belief,) I don't see us ever straightening all beliefs out. A perspective that leads us to the final, and perhaps most important aspect of integrity of beliefs, understanding my own fallibility. This is a critical concept in pragmatism, one that answers Russell's early complaints against it, that just as I conceive of myself as capable of thoughtful belief, I must see the other person as just as thoughtful, just as capable, and remember that I am as fallible as anyone, and temper my beliefs against my fallibility rather than someone else's.
Monday, October 9, 2017
Critical Thinking in a Chevy Cavalier
I recently helped my daughter, Carol, move from Dallas to
Bellingham, a small town about an hour north of Seattle. The drive in her fully
loaded 2000 Chevy Cavalier took us four days. One leg of the journey was from
Ft Collins, just north of Denver, to Laramie, a two-lane road not
taken; it skirts around Cheyenne, and takes the driver through a rugged,
western landscape. We caught occasional glimpses of the Rocky Mountains in the
distant clouds, small herds of pronghorn antelope, and sandstone outcroppings,
as we drove.
At one point, Carol said to me . . . but first, since this
post is about critical thinking, let me give a little background to clarify the
significance of the brief comment she made. That background comes from TV,
Disney, the internet, anything that in the 21st Century both
fascinates us and draws us into its little world, and at the same time repels
us by competing with what we see as the “real world.”
Occasionally, and this seems to come up often enough that it
has become a trope, someone will tell the story of going somewhere with a child
or teenager, somewhere spectacular, perhaps the Grand Canyon or the Eifel Tower,
and hear the child say, “Oh, it looks just like TV,” or, “Oh, just like Disney
World.”
This example frustrates us because we think our children are
replacing the reality with the digital--or at least not being dazzled by the
reality because they can no longer seen anything but the digital. On a deeper
level, it frustrates us because it’s an example of linear thinking that fails
to take in context or significance, which in turn disappoints us because we
feel like some of the wonder of the world might be lost.
Now, back to that Chevy Cavalier. At one point, as we passed
a particularly spectacular rock outcropping, Carol said, “You know, I always
thought those fiberglass rocks at Disney World were so fake. Now I realize that
they were really trying to make them look like the real thing.”
This reaction is subtly and significantly different, from
the “Oh, just like . . .” reaction, and gives us an example of how critical
thinking moves beyond linear thinking, even though they might start from the
same place. Notice, first, that linear thinking simply notes similarity. Critical
thinking, on the other hand, notes the similarity, then examines that
similarity for possible reasons. In this case, cause and effect might be a
reason. However, if no reason is found, critical thinking doesn’t manufacture
reasons. In this case, in order for cause and effect to be a
sufficient reason, there must be yet another reason beneath it, that in turn,
can explain cause and effect, yet itself might remain unspoken. And, there is: artists
working for Disney are attempting to recreate natural phenomenon in order to
make visitors feel like they are in another place. From this unstated reason, Carol recognized immediately that there is cause and effect, not simply similarity.
Something else is taking place here, something necessary to
critical thinking, so necessary that I would argue without this, it isn’t
critical thinking: This something else is the revision of (or the possibility of revision of) previously
held beliefs. This necessary aspect of critical thinking can be found in
Carol’s, “I used to think . . ..” What she used to think she would have been
glad to state as a fact before that moment: “Oh, those rocks in the Canada
Pavilion may be impressive, but like all things Disney, they’re just cartoon
versions of the real. They’re anime made from fiberglass. They really shouldn’t
overdo it like that. I’d rather see something more realistic.”
This aspect, the willingness to change our minds, forces us
to recognize an important roadblock to critical thinking: if we don’t want to
change our minds, we don’t need critical thinking; in fact, critical thinking
is positively dangerous and should be avoided at all costs. No matter what we
call it, any kind of thinking that requires us to hold onto what we’ve always
believed, no matter how strong the evidence against that belief, doesn’t
qualify as critical thinking. Critical thinking isn’t simply open to change, it
welcomes change, welcomes the possibility that around every bend in the road, previously
held beliefs may be shattered, or at least revised. And, this is the scariest
thing about critical thinking; it’s precisely why some avoid it at all costs.
* This is precisely what is sought in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
He asks if it is reasonable to assume that because there are similarities
between something constructed by a human, such as a house, and something in
nature, in fact, nature itself, that this provides sufficient evidence that
what we see in nature has a creator. As in any effective dialogue, the reader
is left to make that decision.
Wednesday, August 16, 2017
An Aside on Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy
In the opening pages of The
Problems of Philosophy, when Bertrand Russell outlines the basic
philosophical problem of appearance and reality, he writes that artists “have
to learn the habit of seeing things as they appear.”* His point has to do with
perspective, that we see every object from a personal viewpoint or perspective. I have to wonder
whether even in 1912, when The Problems
of Philosophy was first published, if artists were still trying to see
things as they appear. The impressionist movement, with Van Gogh, Renoir, Monet,
was already in full swing, perhaps even by 1912 already cresting its wave, and being muscled out by Post-Impressionism, though I suspect this is a
category only bandied about by art experts. The point, simple enough, by 1912,
the forefront of art had already lost interest, not only in appearance, but
reality, since they were painting impressions, or interpretations, or experiences,
a move that was mirrored across the Atlantic in pragmatism, which its most
vocal proponent, William James, was wont to call a method, and which Russell
vehemently denied could call itself a philosophy.
* My copy of The Problems of Philosophy is a reprint,
without pagination, or indeed margins wide enough for me to make notes in. Not being able to write notes in the margins drives me crazy.
Wednesday, August 2, 2017
Nietzsche's The Genealogy of Morals
I can only describe listening to Nietzsche's The Genealogy of Morals as embarrassing.
The first graduate class I took while still an undergraduate was a summer class in Nietzsche. A hundred pages of Nietzsche every night for five weeks. It was an experience. Ah, but what I learned. I learned how to read critically, how to follow complex and often convoluted lines of reasoning, how to identify and explicate key words and phrases. (Philosophers love to coin new words or give new names to familiar words.) I learned that you could weave understanding out of a philosopher; you didn't have to take the whole system to take what was useful to you and leave what wasn't.
I left that class with a grudging respect for Nietzsche. For quite a while afterwards I found myself saying things like, "The Nazi's misunderstood Nietszche," or "They selected passages out of context." Those youthful appreciation has been shattered while listening to The Genealogy of Morals. This time I can't help but see the "free man" described in the Essay One as emblazoned with a swastika.
Now, I find myself trying to understand my attitude from so many years ago. Reading Nietzsche through the lens of Foucault it is possible to see the free man as the intellectual resisting the "will to power" of the hegemonic discourse. Unfortunately, reading Nietzsche through the lens of Aryan superiority, it is all too easy to see the free man as an oppressor with no concern but his own power. (I am going to assume that this is one case where gendered language will be acceptable.) Either interpretation is possible. Hence, my embarrassment. Can Nietzsche be reformed by reading him as a critic of Victorian morals? Or, is he forever tainted by being read as calling for an opposition to morals in the name of power?
It is a few days later . . .
. . . and I'm in the middle of listening to Essay Three, which intrigues me as much as Essay One embarrassed me, particularly Nietzsche's exposition of the interrelated flaws of the religion, atheism, and science of his day. At the beginning of these passages, he writers that his reader is the reader who does not need to be convinced. We might understand that as the reader who already agrees with him, that is, the audience of most partisan politics. I am drawn back to Plato's distinction between the philosopher and the poet in Ion. In Plato's parlance, Nietzsche is a poet rather than a philosopher. He is caught up in the muse of anger, and his readers are those who are attracted, like Plato's example of the lodestone, to, even caught up in, that anger.
Rage against the machine, Nietzsche.
The first graduate class I took while still an undergraduate was a summer class in Nietzsche. A hundred pages of Nietzsche every night for five weeks. It was an experience. Ah, but what I learned. I learned how to read critically, how to follow complex and often convoluted lines of reasoning, how to identify and explicate key words and phrases. (Philosophers love to coin new words or give new names to familiar words.) I learned that you could weave understanding out of a philosopher; you didn't have to take the whole system to take what was useful to you and leave what wasn't.
I left that class with a grudging respect for Nietzsche. For quite a while afterwards I found myself saying things like, "The Nazi's misunderstood Nietszche," or "They selected passages out of context." Those youthful appreciation has been shattered while listening to The Genealogy of Morals. This time I can't help but see the "free man" described in the Essay One as emblazoned with a swastika.
Now, I find myself trying to understand my attitude from so many years ago. Reading Nietzsche through the lens of Foucault it is possible to see the free man as the intellectual resisting the "will to power" of the hegemonic discourse. Unfortunately, reading Nietzsche through the lens of Aryan superiority, it is all too easy to see the free man as an oppressor with no concern but his own power. (I am going to assume that this is one case where gendered language will be acceptable.) Either interpretation is possible. Hence, my embarrassment. Can Nietzsche be reformed by reading him as a critic of Victorian morals? Or, is he forever tainted by being read as calling for an opposition to morals in the name of power?
It is a few days later . . .
. . . and I'm in the middle of listening to Essay Three, which intrigues me as much as Essay One embarrassed me, particularly Nietzsche's exposition of the interrelated flaws of the religion, atheism, and science of his day. At the beginning of these passages, he writers that his reader is the reader who does not need to be convinced. We might understand that as the reader who already agrees with him, that is, the audience of most partisan politics. I am drawn back to Plato's distinction between the philosopher and the poet in Ion. In Plato's parlance, Nietzsche is a poet rather than a philosopher. He is caught up in the muse of anger, and his readers are those who are attracted, like Plato's example of the lodestone, to, even caught up in, that anger.
Rage against the machine, Nietzsche.
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