Socrates and the Scientific Method

I listened to the first section of the LibriVox recording of The Apology. As Socrates begins his defense—a defense that it will turn out is nothing of the sort—he shows tendencies toward one aspect of pragmatism, one that tends to be overlooked by its critics. 

He tells the story of Chaerephon, who asked the Oracle at Delphi if there was anyone wiser than Socrates. The Oracle answered no, there was no one wiser. Socrates, unable to accept the Oracle’s assessment, since as he told his judges, he did not think himself wise, decided to test the oracle. He went to those with a reputation of wisdom—a politician, a poet, a craftsman—and found each of them had the reputation for wisdom without the thing itself. He concluded that the only reason the Oracle said that there was no one wiser than he was because at least he knew he was not wise. These others all thought they were. Thus, none was wise, but at least he was not deceiving himself.

How does this demonstrate pragmatic tendencies? Notice that for all intents and purposes, Socrates’s method was scientific. Develop a theory; test the theory; come to a conclusion. If the test gives a clear conclusion, then you can take that conclusion as fact. For James, facts, scientific facts are not subject to philosophical musings. They are established, and as James says, ““simple come and are” (Pragmatism 32). This is the conclusion Socrates came to. He decided that it was a clear fact that he was not wiser than anyone else because no one was wise. (In other dialogues, when he talks admirably about others, he refers to them as "seekers after wisdom.")

Admittedly, the idea that what can be scientifically tested becomes fact and is no longer subject to metaphysical speculation is only a small part of pragmatism. But, we are not looking for a systematic theory in Plato’s Socrates, merely the possibility that he applied pragmatic principles where they are useful.  

I know, that italicized phrase, “where they are useful” doesn’t sound Socrates at all, does it? In fact, that is precisely Socrates’s complaint against the Sophists, that they did what was useful instead of what is true.  But in both Plato’s Socrates and pragmatism, truth is a stickier word than fact. 

As I said earlier, pragmatism's lack of concern with fact has been misinterpreted by its critics. Thus, when Bertrand Russell writes that "ironclads and Maxim guns must be the ultimate arbiters of metaphysical truth" for pragmatists, he mistakes the pragmatist's acceptance of scientific fact for indifference, and does not notice that for a pragmatist, facts (confirmed, tested, IE scientific) trump metaphysics.