At least that's the theory. Even so, when I walk onto a used care lot, I know that the salesman wants to sell me a car for as much as possible, just as I want to buy a car for as little as possible. This does not sound like a relationship built on ethics at all.
We run into even more problems when the audience thinks that the relationship is based on virtue when it is really based on utility. That car salesman is doing everything he can to convince me that he is on my side, that he wants to help me. He is trying to be my friend. The ethics of that situation becomes even murkier, particularly if he is successful.
Pleasure adds another dimension that makes those clear categorizations even murkier. Plato was always worried that pleasure would disguise the true nature of the relationship, although he expressed this worry in terms of truth. For Plato, since truth did not need decorative language designed to please the audience, whenever he heard rhetorical devices he worried that their very use could only mean one thing, to disguise truth.
When rhetoric disguises the relationship what happens to truth?
(In a previous version of this post I erroneously identified this passage as being in the ninth chapter. Thanks for catching that, Danny. I'm referencing the W. D. Ross found at the International Classics Archive, http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/nicomachaen.html.
No comments:
Post a Comment