Timeaus on Mind and True Opinion

This passage from the dialogue Timeaus isn't placed in Socrates's mouth by Plato, but in Timeaus's. I'm not sure what that says about how Plato feels about the ideas in this monologue, though I have to wonder why he would give Timeaus so much time to expound on these metaphysical ideas if he disagreed with them, or at least would have Socrates question them.

Timeaus is in the midst of a long monologue about the origins of the universe, and here distinguishes between "mind" and "true opinion." By identifying opinion as true, he isn't questioning its veracity, but its source. One comes from being, the other from becoming. One is eternal, the other is in flux. One comes from reason, the other from experience, or the senses.

This strikes me as giving some insight on Plato's philosophy of forms. When he talks about the real and the imitation in Phaedrus, he uses physical objects, such as a table or a bridal as examples. It seems to me, however, that in this passage, forms (should we call them essence?) can only be metaphysical, or none corporal, that is essence, while the material is always changing.   


"If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind ; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm that to be distinct, for they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted in us by instruction, the other by persuasion ; the one is always accompanied by true reason, the other is without reason ; the one cannot be overcome by persuasion, but the other can : and lastly, every man may be said to share in true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men."