Ethics, Part III, Notes
from Propositions 25 to 31
Spinoza so clearly nails the state of modern politics that he needs no commentary. Who, in your estimation best fits this description?
"This
endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely in order to please men, we
call ambition, especially when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar,
that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases
it is generally called kindliness.
"This endeavour to bring it about,
that our own likes and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really ambition
(see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone by nature desires
(appetere), that the rest of mankind should live according to his own
individual disposition: when such a desire is equally present in all, everyone
stands in everyone else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all,
all become mutually hateful.
"Thus we see
that it may readily happen, that a man may easily think too highly of himself,
or a loved object, and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This
feeling is called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of
himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with his eyes open,
thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his
conception, and thereupon accounting them real, and exulting in them, so long
as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence, and
determines his own power of action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing
from a man thinking too highly of himself.
"Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be an annoyance to all."
Ethics, Book III, Notes to Propositions 26 to 30
"Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be an annoyance to all."
Ethics, Book III, Notes to Propositions 26 to 30
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