Misunderstanding the Sophists II: They were Relativists

I don't want to question the idea that the sophists were relatives, merely clarify what kind of relativists they were and how we might read them. Let's start with modern relativism, which is simple enough. Modern relativists are cultural relativists. They insist that simply because we hold one idea of the true and just doesn't mean it's any better than the ideas of the true and just of another culture. We might also think of cultural relativism as historical relativism, the idea that at one time in history we might hold one concept of the true and just; at another time a different concept. Example: at various times homosexuality has been seen as a sin, a mental disorder, an alternative lifestyle, as normal as any other choice. A relativist might insist that at any given point any one of those views is as good as another. I am not interested in arguing with cultural/historical relativist, only point out how this form of relativism was different from the relativism of the sophists.

In this case, we're not so much looking at the sophists through the eyes of Plato and Aristotle, as we are revere engineering the arguments against sophism they make. Both spend a lot of time arguing that a thing cannot be and not be, which if of course the foundation of Aristotle's logic, that A cannot be not A at the same time. Plato's argument against the sophists as thinkers rather than rhetoricians comes out in Parmenides, particularly Zeno's recitation of the arguments in the book he wrote in defense of Pamenides's argument in favor of the one over the many. There are moments in Zeno's recitation that he appears to be contradicting himself, primarily due to his relativism.

Here's the point: the relativism of Parmenides and Zeno isn't cultural; it's a relativism built into the nature of language itself, particularly in Cratylus, in names. A key element is the argument that one cannot say anything that is not true. The problem, at least for us, in understanding relativism build on language, comes out in in Euthydemus, where, as Plato intended, it sounds ridiculous.When one of Socrates's interlocutors argues that one cannot say anything that is untrue, that paradox comes to the fore. We all recognize that two contradictory statements cannot both be true--at least this is what logic teaches us. Aristotle goes a step farther, giving extended examples, such as . . . just because a man says he is in Thebes when he is actually in Athens, doesn't mean he is in Thebes.

This argument against the sophists is similar to the argument one often hears against the post-structuralists. I have heard more than one rhetorician or philosopher say something along these lines: "What the post-structuralists don't seem to understand is that their ideas eventually lead to nihilism." This is similar to the critique Russell made of pragmatism: "What the pragmatists dont' seem to understand is where their philosophy leads." His famous remark that in pragmatism, "ironclads and Maxim guns must be the ultimate arbiters of metaphysical truth" comes from the same viewpoint, that outside the system that only notices the inconsistencies (or perceived inconsistencies) and assume that those within the system cannot see them due to some deficiency in their thinking. One might as easily use use Burke's "terministic screen" as an explanation. In the end, what one is doing is a variation of ad hominem, the assumption that we are simply smarter than the other guy. (Look what that did to Enron.)

When this happened in one of those cocktail hour conversations as a conference, I asked two questions: "You know some of these people, right? Do they strike you as smart or dumb?" Of course, they're all pretty smart. So, the logical conclusion is this: "If they are smart, but their ideas seem dumb, then the only conclusion is that we don't really understand their ideas yet." (Thank you Sherlock Holmes for that bit of logic: "Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth.")

So, can we ask the same question of the sophists? Of course, Plato and Aristotle didn't assume these were dumb people, they assumed they were dishonest, seeking only their own advantage. This is certainly the view in Euthydemus, and the contrast between Euthydemus and his brother's dialectic and Socrates's.

Let's start from a different perspective, what if we asked ourselves how a relativism based on language, that started from the idea that nothing that could be said is untrue. How could that idea neither be illogical nor immoral?

I'll give my answer to that question in "Misunderstanding the Sophists III: They were Immoral.