Wednesday, June 7, 2017

Critias's Metaphor of a Painting



In the dialogue bearing his name, Critias asks his listeners indulgence, IE not to be too critical of the veracity of the story he is about to tell. He tells his readers that he's going to be talking about men, not the gods. Because the topic is familiar to his hearers, he is concerned that they will be overly critical. It's easier, he argues, to talk about things that are unfamiliar; then, your hearers are more open to your authority. He gives a similar, though alternative metaphor of painting, to the one Socrates gives in Phaedrus.

Listening to this got me wondering what this request by Critias says about Plato's writing. When he writes about chariots ascending to the heavens, are we supposed to accept his words, since these are unfamiliar ideas? When he writes about Socrates, does he take more care because he knows his readers (at least his readers at the time) knew the man as well as he? Critias is a later dialogue. Some suspect one of the last if not the last, hence unfinished. Is this request by Critias a commentary on his own writing? Plato was such a careful writer we have to at least suspect that he was aware of how it might function as a commentary on his own work.

CRITIAS: “All that is said by any of us can only be imitation and representation. Or if we consider the likeness which painters make of bodies divine and heavenly, and the different degrees of gratification with which the eye of the spectator receives them, we shall see that we are satisfied with the artist who is able to any degree to imitate the earth and its mountains, and the rivers, and the woods, and the universe, and the things that are and move therein, and further, that knowing nothing precise about such matters, we do not examine or analyze the painting; all that is requires is a sort of indistinct and deceptive mode of shadowing them forth. Btu when a person endeavours to paint the human form we are quick at fining out defects, and our familiar knowledge makes us severe judges of any one who does nor render every point of similarity. And we may observe the same thing to happen in discourse; we are satisfied with a picture of diving and heavenly things which has very little likeness to them; but we are more precise in our criticism of mortal and human things. Wherefore if  the moment of speaking I cannot suitably express my meaning, you must excuse me, considering that to form approved likenesses of human things is the reverse of easy.”

Aristotle's Metaphysics

I'm working my way through the Metaphysics right now, and I'm struck by how seldom Aristotle discusses what we normally think of as metaphysics, at least after reviewing pre-Socratic philosophers' ideas about the substance of the universe (fire, water, air). I listened to Chapter Six this morning. Though Aristotle bandies about words such as substance, essence, universal, when he moves to examples, he's more likely to use man and animal, Socrates and musical, than he is the Sun, one of the few examples he brings forward as universal. Even here, he seems more concerned with how we categorize the sun. He argues that if the sun came out at night, it would still be the sun. That's such an ironic argument, I'm still not sure what to make of it.

I've reached Chapter Eleven (in McMahon, who has an idiosyncratic chaptering; other translators number this chapter Twelve). Aristotle starts out with, "That, indeed, Wisdom is a certain science conversant about first principles is evident from the early portions of this work." He gives us notice that the previous chapters have set the stage for this and subsequent chapters. Looking back over those first ten chapters (I know, the math doesn't add up) they focused on two tasks: first, reviewing what others have said, and second, establishing firm definitions for Aristotle's terms, definitions he will now use to develop his metaphysics.

Sunday, June 4, 2017

The Iliad, Theology and Fate

Recently finished listening to The Iliad. Some immediate thoughts:

Though the gods appear regularly throughout The Iliad, there's little or no theology. But then, there isn't much theology in the Pentateuch either. Most of the theology comes later in the Bible. One concern both have is the relationship between the divine and the human. In both, the divine has commitments to humans that is both corporal and individual. In both, those relationships are built on a parenthood, though in radically different ways, one pantheistic and the other monotheistic. One l, physical, the other metaphorical. 

Those relationships do much to explain the arbitrariness of life and fate as conceived in both. In The Iliad, the Greeks and the Trojans prevail as a result of interference of the gods in the actions of men. The various gods have chosen sides, and the war goes one way and then the other depending on which god interferes at that moment--often which god is allowed to interfere by Jove. More often than not, which individuals and which side prevails has little to do with the ethos/virtue of the humans involved, but whether they are progeny or not. In The Bible, the fate of the Israelites is based on communal obedience. That holds true for individuals as well (Adam, David). However, this is not a straight reward system. Some individuals, (Jonah, Gideon) do not initially obey God. In fact, some actually head in the opposite direction (Paul), which can make the God of The Bible appear as capricious as the gods of the Greeks.

The first two chapters of Mimesis by Aurbach sheds some light on the differences between the way the two documents portray reality. I need to go back and reread those chapters.

The place of fate in the lives of the Greeks and Trojans is interesting, particularly for Achilles. He is told he is fated to die, but become legendary, if he kills Hector as revenge for the death of Patroclus, but live a long and prosperous life if he chooses to let it go. Thus, his fate does not appear preordained, but to depend on choice. However, his character as revealed in The Illiad, which emphasizes his stubborn anger, suggests that though he might be given two options, he only has one choice, the one that is in line with his ethos.