I'm working my way through the Metaphysics right now, and I'm struck by how seldom Aristotle discusses what we normally think of as metaphysics, at least after reviewing pre-Socratic philosophers' ideas about the substance of the universe (fire, water, air). I listened to Chapter Six this morning. Though Aristotle bandies about words such as substance, essence, universal, when he moves to examples, he's more likely to use man and animal, Socrates and musical, than he is the Sun, one of the few examples he brings forward as universal. Even here, he seems more concerned with how we categorize the sun. He argues that if the sun came out at night, it would still be the sun. That's such an ironic argument, I'm still not sure what to make of it.
I've reached Chapter Eleven (in McMahon, who has an idiosyncratic chaptering; other translators number this chapter Twelve). Aristotle starts out with, "That, indeed, Wisdom is a certain science conversant about first principles is evident from the early portions of this work." He gives us notice that the previous chapters have set the stage for this and subsequent chapters. Looking back over those first ten chapters (I know, the math doesn't add up) they focused on two tasks: first, reviewing what others have said, and second, establishing firm definitions for Aristotle's terms, definitions he will now use to develop his metaphysics.
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