Sunday, April 17, 2016

Quintilian Institutes: Verisimilitude and Narrative


At the beginning of Book II, Quintilian categorizes narrative 
verisimilitude according to the categories "fictitious" and "true." 
Later he questions the "truth" in some historical narratives, 
even though he classifies them as true here. It's going to be 
interesting to see how his different categories play out when he 
get to the "best method of narration" later. Will he, like 
Corax and Tisias play truth games with the probable and make 
the worse the better? 
"Now there are three forms of narrative, without 2 
counting the type used in actual legal cases. First 
there is the fictitious narrative as we get it in 
tragedies and poems, which is not merely not true 
but has little resemblance to truth. Secondly, there 
is the realistic narrative as presented by comedies, 
which, though not true, has yet a certain verisimili- 
tude. Thirdly there is the historical narrative, which 
is an exposition of actual fact. Poetic narratives 
are the property of the teacher of literature. The 
rhetorician therefore should begin with the his- 
torical narrative, whose force is in proportion to its 
truth.I will, however, postpone my demonstration 3 
of what I regard as the best method of narration 
till I come to deal with narration as required in the 
courts."

Tuesday, April 12, 2016

Quintilian, The Institutes of Oratory, Proper Usage



In chapters five and six of Book I, Quintilian carefully maps out proper usage, drawing on analogy, etymology, and rational arguments to establish the proper usage. These chapters are reminiscent of Socrates’s review of the origins of names and their true meanings in Cratylus. 

Though I found most of Cratylus pedantic, I can easily imagine Plato’s audience listening to these passages being read with interest, perhaps even laughter. After all, Plato often included in-jokes in his dialogues, and modern readers are not part of the "in" crowd. They'd fly right over our heads. 

Unlike Quintilian, for whom the litany of proper usage seems sufficient to his task, the education of the young, Plato ends his long list with an explanation of how knowing the proper names can be used in dialectic to trip up an opponent, thus revealing his own method of deconstruction as well as complicating his theory of language. Language is referential, yes, but it refers to what I can convince you it refers to.  

Quintilian ends these chapters by drawing an analogy between “common usage” as a means of deciding on whether a specific word or phrase is acceptable, and “common usage” to decide moral issues. If it's not a good idea for one, it's not a good idea for the other.

He doesn’t go as far as Plato in condemning democracy. Instead, he argues that the common usage of learned men should take precedence over the common usage of the masses, on the surface as elitist an outlook as Plato’s. However, I think we have to be careful when we play the “elitist” card. As soon as I thought "elitist" while listening to The Institutes of Oratory, I reminded myself that for elite Roman citizens, learned men often meant the Greek slaves who tutored their sons, and intriguing convolution of class, ethnicity, and education. (The most elitist language in that sentence refers to gender, doesn’t it?

Friday, April 8, 2016

Quintilian on the Separation of Philosophy and Rhetoric

Quintilian gives a fascinating, if brief , account of the separation of rhetoric and philosophy in Rome. First, he tells his readers that the original fault lies with rhetoric, or at least, rhetoricians, their mercenary bent and ethical problems. He writes, "as soon as the tongue became an instrument of gain, and it was made a practice to abuse the gifts of eloquence, those who were esteemed as eloquent abandoned the care of morals." So, greed led rhetoricians to seek their own gratification over the needs of the state. Something Plato could wholeheartedly agree with. However, Plato would not agree with the next statement, for Quintilian argues that as a result of the separation of the two, philosophy suffered from a lack of intellectual rigor. According to Quintilian, "when thus neglected, [philosophy] became as it were the prize of the less robust intellects." Thus, rhetoric deteriorated morally, and philosophy deteriorated intellectually.

The solution? Joining the two: "Let the orator, therefore, be such a man as may be called truly wise, not blameless in morals only (for that, in my opinion, though some disagree with me, is not enough) but accomplished also in science and in every qualification for speaking, a character such as, perhaps, no man ever was. But we are not the less, for that reason, to aim at perfection, for which most of the ancients strove, who, though they thought that no wise man had yet been found, nevertheless laid down directions for gaining wisdom. For the perfection of eloquence is assuredly something, nor does the nature of the human mind forbid us to reach it, but if to reach it be not granted us, yet those who shall strive to gain the summit will make higher advances than those who, prematurely conceiving a despair of attaining the point at which they aim, shall at once sink down at the foot of the ascent."

Institutes of Oratory. Preface. 13-20

Thursday, March 31, 2016

Quintilian's Institutes of Oratory

Reading Grassi's Rhetoric as Philosophy with graduate students right now. His emphasis on what he refers to as Italian Humanism (rhetoricians and scholars from Cicero to Vico) and his use of metaphor as a proof, making him challenging for students brought up in analysis and critique. As we were discussing his short book the other night I realized how incomplete my reading in Cicero and Quintilian is. So, I am listening to Quintilian's Institutes of Oratory for the next few weeks.

Here's a taste of what he has to say in the Preface, where he addresses Plato's concern about rhetoricians devoid of virtue, echoed by Kant and Locke. Note that Quintilian's insistence that the "perfect orator" be a good man, and that ethics is as much the purview of rhetoric as philosophy is based on the need for orators to be citizens, that is, involved in public affairs:  


"We are to form, then, the perfect orator, who cannot exist unless as a good man, and we require in him, therefore, not only consummate ability in speaking, but every excellence of mind. 10. For I cannot admit that the principles of moral and honorable conduct are, as some have thought, to be left to the philosophers; since the man who can duly sustain his character as a citizen, who is qualified for the management of public and private affairs, and who can govern communities by his counsels, settle them by means of laws, and improve them by judicial enactments, can certainly be nothing else but an orator" (9).

Tuesday, March 29, 2016

The First Deconstructionist?




“Plato is mounting an effort to destroy time by using writing to kill all the voices of the past while at the same time using it to preclude its use in the future. After Plato, there will be nothing but continuing repetitions of Plato” (7) Neel, Jasper. Plato, Derrida, And Writing. Southern Illinois University Press. Carbonedale, ILL: 1988.
 
Jasper Neel  argues, quite vehemently, that Plato is the first deconstructionist because he argues for and against the same position, illustrating the illusionary nature of language in Phaedrus, where there will be "nothing but continuing repetitions of Plato."

Whether Neel's critique of Plato's motives is on point or not, another dialogue, Cratylus, seems to reveal a deconstrutive Socrates. 

The title of the dialogue is itself deceptive, since Cratylus hardly says a word until the last section. Prior to that, the dialogue takes place almost exclusively between Socrates and Hermogenes, who complains to Socrates that Cratylus has claimed that Hermogenes is not a true son of Hermes, which he sees as an insult. Socrates explains Hermes true nature to Hermogenes, his first act of deconstruction: “the name Hermes has to do with speech,and signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger,or thief, or liar, or bargainer.” (Always ready to get a dig in at rhetoric, or at least speech makers.)

Throughout the dialogue, Socrates uses etymology to explain the archaic, and thus true meaning of certain words. Though Socrates employs a referential model of language throughout, this can be seen as a typically deconstrutive move, since the true meanings of the various words are controlled by Socrates.

Socrates bemoans the tendency to add or subtract letters from archaic words, thus disguizing the original meaning. Here is an example of his method:

Soc. Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original names
have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and
stripping off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening
them in all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share in the
change. Take, for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter r
inserted? This must surely be the addition of some one who cares nothing
about the truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into shape.
And the additions are often such that at last no human being can possibly
make out the original meaning of the word. 

Socrates explains in detail, too much detail for a blog, the way to discover the original meaning, which he says was developed by "legislators." Of course, he argues, legislators can be wrong. Consquentally, there can be true names and false names. What I find fascinating, is that if legislators came up with the names, they can do so for ulterior motives, thus providing one of the most important underpinnings of post-structuralist critique, a conspiracy that must be revealed through the method.

Soc. And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters
which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may
be adapted to any object.

The method is useful, explains Socrates, because you can so fluster your opponent that he gives up.

Soc. Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest attention
and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person go
on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the elements
out of which the words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this
process, he who has to answer him must at last give up the enquiry
in despair. 

No conclusion, no agreement is reached. The unreliability of language is exposed.



The first deconstructionist? (The typical answer to this question is, "You decide." But, with deconstruction, agency, like language, gets lost in the shuffle.) 

Wednesday, March 23, 2016

Coming back after Plantar Fasciitis

I feel like I'm back. I've been running every other day for the last ten days with no pain. I'm keeping it simple, trying hard not to go overboard. I can remember when I first started running, I had to discipline myself in so many ways, to get up early, to complete the full distance in long runs, to stay on the right pace in fast runs. Now, I have to discipline myself to hold back. It feels good to run for the first time in four months, and I just want to run. Every day my foot feels a little better, during the run, after the run, on my rest day. I'm holding myself to a routine: 


On running days: stretch, walk at least a half mile, keep the pace comfortable (IE don't look at the Garmin, which might push my to, well, push harder), one hour of running (distance and speed doesn't matter; just run comfortably), walk for a half mile, then stretch again.

On non-running days: stretch my tendons as often as I can remember, massage sole with golf ball (my son and daughter looked at me like I was crazy until I made them try it. The oohs and ahhs were testament to how good it feels. Then, your feet tingle for ten minutes afterwards. You can feel the circulation improving.)