Saturday, April 23, 2016

Institutes Book 2 Chapter 16 Quntilian's Defense of Rhetoric



In Book Two, Chapters 16 through 20, Quintilian defends rhetoric against all comers. First, he takes on Plato’s complaint that rhetoric can be used as easily for ill as for good with a bit of satire. 

“In the hands of physicians poisons have been found, and among those who abuse the name of philosophers have been occasionally detected the most horrible crimes. We must reject food, for it has often given rise to ill health; we must never go under roofs, for they sometimes fall upon those who dwell beneath them; a sword must not be forged for a soldier, for a robber may use the same weapon.”

His deeper argument, however, is to question the definition of rhetoric as persuasion, redefining it is eloquence. Though this sets him up for Ramus’s attack later, it allows him to connect rhetoric to virtue. 

"But these points may perhaps be left to the consideration of those who think that the substance of eloquence lies in the power to persuade. But if eloquence be the art of speaking well (the definition which I adopt), so that a true orator must be, above all, a good man, it must assuredly be acknowledged that it is a useful art."

As yet, Quintilian hasn’t explained why it requires a good man to be a rhetorician, other than the “true” rhetoric argument. But, that’s what Weaver argues Plato is actually arguing in “Phaedrus.” 

Wednesday, April 20, 2016

The Seeds of Vico and Grassi

In this brief statement, Quintilian places the imaginative above the analytical, or at least before the analytical, a theme that is repeated and elaborated on in Vico and Grassi. At question in Quintilian is whether the imaginative is elementary or the foundational. If elementary it can be left behind when analysis comes to the fore; if foundational provides much of the framework for invention.


"Exuberance is easilv remedied, but barrenness is incurable, be your efforts what they may. To my mind the boy who gives least promise is one in whom the critical faculty develops in advance of the imagination. I like to see the first fruits of the mind copious to excess and almost extravagant in their profusion."

Book II, Chapter 4

Sunday, April 17, 2016

Quintilian Institutes: Verisimilitude and Narrative


At the beginning of Book II, Quintilian categorizes narrative 
verisimilitude according to the categories "fictitious" and "true." 
Later he questions the "truth" in some historical narratives, 
even though he classifies them as true here. It's going to be 
interesting to see how his different categories play out when he 
get to the "best method of narration" later. Will he, like 
Corax and Tisias play truth games with the probable and make 
the worse the better? 
"Now there are three forms of narrative, without 2 
counting the type used in actual legal cases. First 
there is the fictitious narrative as we get it in 
tragedies and poems, which is not merely not true 
but has little resemblance to truth. Secondly, there 
is the realistic narrative as presented by comedies, 
which, though not true, has yet a certain verisimili- 
tude. Thirdly there is the historical narrative, which 
is an exposition of actual fact. Poetic narratives 
are the property of the teacher of literature. The 
rhetorician therefore should begin with the his- 
torical narrative, whose force is in proportion to its 
truth.I will, however, postpone my demonstration 3 
of what I regard as the best method of narration 
till I come to deal with narration as required in the 
courts."

Tuesday, April 12, 2016

Quintilian, The Institutes of Oratory, Proper Usage



In chapters five and six of Book I, Quintilian carefully maps out proper usage, drawing on analogy, etymology, and rational arguments to establish the proper usage. These chapters are reminiscent of Socrates’s review of the origins of names and their true meanings in Cratylus. 

Though I found most of Cratylus pedantic, I can easily imagine Plato’s audience listening to these passages being read with interest, perhaps even laughter. After all, Plato often included in-jokes in his dialogues, and modern readers are not part of the "in" crowd. They'd fly right over our heads. 

Unlike Quintilian, for whom the litany of proper usage seems sufficient to his task, the education of the young, Plato ends his long list with an explanation of how knowing the proper names can be used in dialectic to trip up an opponent, thus revealing his own method of deconstruction as well as complicating his theory of language. Language is referential, yes, but it refers to what I can convince you it refers to.  

Quintilian ends these chapters by drawing an analogy between “common usage” as a means of deciding on whether a specific word or phrase is acceptable, and “common usage” to decide moral issues. If it's not a good idea for one, it's not a good idea for the other.

He doesn’t go as far as Plato in condemning democracy. Instead, he argues that the common usage of learned men should take precedence over the common usage of the masses, on the surface as elitist an outlook as Plato’s. However, I think we have to be careful when we play the “elitist” card. As soon as I thought "elitist" while listening to The Institutes of Oratory, I reminded myself that for elite Roman citizens, learned men often meant the Greek slaves who tutored their sons, and intriguing convolution of class, ethnicity, and education. (The most elitist language in that sentence refers to gender, doesn’t it?

Friday, April 8, 2016

Quintilian on the Separation of Philosophy and Rhetoric

Quintilian gives a fascinating, if brief , account of the separation of rhetoric and philosophy in Rome. First, he tells his readers that the original fault lies with rhetoric, or at least, rhetoricians, their mercenary bent and ethical problems. He writes, "as soon as the tongue became an instrument of gain, and it was made a practice to abuse the gifts of eloquence, those who were esteemed as eloquent abandoned the care of morals." So, greed led rhetoricians to seek their own gratification over the needs of the state. Something Plato could wholeheartedly agree with. However, Plato would not agree with the next statement, for Quintilian argues that as a result of the separation of the two, philosophy suffered from a lack of intellectual rigor. According to Quintilian, "when thus neglected, [philosophy] became as it were the prize of the less robust intellects." Thus, rhetoric deteriorated morally, and philosophy deteriorated intellectually.

The solution? Joining the two: "Let the orator, therefore, be such a man as may be called truly wise, not blameless in morals only (for that, in my opinion, though some disagree with me, is not enough) but accomplished also in science and in every qualification for speaking, a character such as, perhaps, no man ever was. But we are not the less, for that reason, to aim at perfection, for which most of the ancients strove, who, though they thought that no wise man had yet been found, nevertheless laid down directions for gaining wisdom. For the perfection of eloquence is assuredly something, nor does the nature of the human mind forbid us to reach it, but if to reach it be not granted us, yet those who shall strive to gain the summit will make higher advances than those who, prematurely conceiving a despair of attaining the point at which they aim, shall at once sink down at the foot of the ascent."

Institutes of Oratory. Preface. 13-20